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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a finding of two separate prescriptive easements in favor of
Appellees for:

(1) a water conveyance through the servient estate under Utah Code

Section 57-13a-102; and (2) use of a road on the servient estate under common law. The
easements were granted following a bench trial in the Sixth Judicial District Court,
Sanpete County, the Honorable Judge Marvin Bagley presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction in this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Section 78A-4-103(2).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1: Did Appellants properly preserve those issues of statutory application
and interpretation, public policy, and prescriptive easement which are now presented on
appeal when those issues were never raised by Appellants before the district court?
Standard of Review: To preserve an issue for appellate review:
a party must first raise the issue in the trial court because a trial court must
be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue. . . . To properly preserve an
issue at the district court, the following must take place: (1) the issue must
be raised in timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3)
a party must introduce evidence or relevant legal authority.
See O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46,118, 217 P.3d 704 (emphasis added; internal quotations
and citations omitted).
Issue 2: Did the district court err by applying a duty of maintenance to Appellees
under Utah Code Section 73-1-8 concomitant with a prescriptive easement for water
conveyance?
Standard of Review:

Interpretation of statutes, rules, and ordinances is a

question of law reviewed for correctness. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,
-1-

117, 977 P.2d 1201. The issue of whether a duty exists is also a question of law reviewed
for correctness. See Lopez v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 2009 UT App, <][8, 222 P.3d 1192.
Moreover, an appellate court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any proper ground
evidenced by the record. See State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Issue 3: Did the district court err when it found a prescriptive easement for water
conveyance pursuant to Utah Code Section 57-13a-102?
Standard of Review:

Interpretation of statutes, rules, and ordinances is a

question of law reviewed for correctness. See Rushton, 1999 UT 36, at \\1.

Moreover,

an appellate court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any proper ground evidenced by
the record. See Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149.
Issue 4:

Does the district court's resolution of the property dispute below

somehow violate public policy to such an extent as to constitute clear and reversible error?
Standard of Review: An appellate court will reverse a trial court's decision that
clear and convincing evidence was presented to find a prescriptive easement only if that
decision is clearly erroneous:
To qualify as clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings must be either
against the clear weight of the evidence or must induce a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. . . . Moreover, the finding that an
easement exists is generally so highly fact-intensive that appellate courts
accord the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying the
correct legal standard to the given set of facts.
hunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, \ 18, 186 P.3d 978 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Moreover, an appellate court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any proper
ground evidenced by the record. See Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149.
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Issue 5: Did the district court clearly err in finding a prescriptive easement for a
road across the servient estate when it weighed the evidence at trial?
Standard of Review: An appellate court will reverse a trial court's decision that
clear and convincing evidence was presented to find a prescriptive easement only if that
decision is clearly erroneous:
To qualify as clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings must be either
against the clear weight of the evidence or must induce a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. . . . Moreover, the finding that an
easement exists is generally so highly fact-intensive that appellate courts
accord the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying the
correct legal standard to the given set of facts.
hunt, 2008 UT App 192, at ^[18 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, an
appellate court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any proper ground evidenced by the
record. See Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149.
Issue 6:

Did the district court clearly err by failing to consider evidence of

continuous use for the requisite period to the present, when it was not required to do so
under the elements of prescriptive easement and when it nevertheless did consider and
properly weigh evidence of continuous use to the present?
Standard of Review: The court reviews a district court's findings of fact under a
clear error standard of review, while it reviews conclusions of law for correctness. See
Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 UT App 134, 119, 183 P.3d 1052.1 Moreover, an appellate

1

In the conclusion of their brief, Appellants also request attorneys' fees, without citation
to the record, authority, or engagement in any analysis. Appellees submit that Appellants
should not be granted fees because no basis for a fee award exists and no abuse of
discretion by the district court is demonstrated. See Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley
Dairy Assn'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982).
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court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any proper ground evidenced by the record.
See Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
By this appeal, Appellants seek the reversal of the district court's finding of two
prescriptive easements in favor of Appellees, which easements are associated with a
water course and road which run through Appellants' servient estate.
Appellees are the owners of 186.9 acres of real property located 3/4 mile south of
Manti, Utah and west of old highway 89. (Sept. 2, 2009 Memorandum Decision and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Decision"), at p. 2, \ 1). This property has
been owned and used by Appellees' family since 1852, and is currently used for
agricultural purposes. (Id. at p. 3, fj[ 4, 6). In contrast, Appellants have owned 16.37
acres of real property (the "Servient Estate") located just east of Appellants' property,
since 1989. (Id. at p. 2, f 2).
A watercourse (the "Watercourse") originates at Crystal Springs—located further
east and upstream from both properties—and eventually runs through the Servient Estate
to Appellees' property. (Id. at p. 3, f 8). Appellee's own water rights for six-sevenths of
the water in the Watercourse; Appellants own water rights for the remaining one-seventh.
(Id. at p. 4, ff 9-10). An unpaved road (the "Road") somewhat parallels the Watercourse
on the Servient Estate, and provides access to Appellees' property. (Id. at p. 4, f 11).
For reasons irrelevant to this appeal, a dispute recently arose between Appellees
and Appellants with respect to Appellees' rights to access the Watercourse and/or the
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Road. The dispute was ultimately heard pursuant to a June 3, 2009 bench trial before the
Honorable Judge Bagley in the Sixth District.
At trial, Fred Lowry, among others, testified for Appellees that he began using the
Road in the 1940s to obtain unimpeded daily or weekly access to Appellee's property.
(Trial Tr. June 3, 2009, at 18:15-17; 21:17-25; 34). Mr. Lowry testified that he used the
Road for various purposes, and on various occasions, through the subsequent decades of
the 1950s, 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s. (See id. at 22-23; 41:8-11). Mr. Lowry also testified
that, except for the year leading to the dispute (when he was blocked by Appellants), he
never stopped using the Road. (See id. at 30:25; 31:2-12). Mr. Lowry testified that his
use of the Road was not permissive. (See, e.g., id. at 35:19-24; 38:8-10).
Mr. Lowry further testified on behalf of Appellees that his use of the Watercourse
to convey water to Appellees' property corresponded with his use of the Road. (See, e.g.,
id. at 30:18-24; 39:19-23; 40:12-14). Mr. Lowry testified that he, or his agents and
assigns, maintained the Watercourse over the years. (See id. at 30:18-24). At trial, while
sometimes referring to the Watercourse as a "stream", Appellants, their counsel, and their
witnesses also repeatedly and alternately referred to it as a "channel" or "ditch." (Id. at
93:19-20; 164:14-19; 221:10-11; 233:9).
On September 1, 2009, the district court found in favor of Appellees through its
Decision. Specifically, the district court found a prescriptive easement by Appellees for a
water conveyance on the Servient Estate pursuant to Utah Code Section 57-13a-102.
(See Decision, at p. 8, f 1). Concomitant with this easement, the district court imposed
upon Appellees a duty of maintenance for the Watercourse under Utah Code Section 73-5-

1 8 , (See id, at p.R, % 2: p H

4

^

The district court noted that this easement was subject

id. at p. 9 , 1 4 ) . rhe district court also found a prescriptive easement over the Road. (See
M. at p. 9, f l 5-r

'"- ' ^ ) .

;*;..:*.:-••

.

,
(list! iet coin I: ei i lphasized ti lat I!»
It I cri \ i y "s testin 101 i) \ as

wholly "i inrebi itted" by Appellee's witnesses through at least 1967. (See id at p. 9, j[ 6).
The district court partially summarized Mr. I,owry?s testimony as follows:
Fred Lowry testified as to his use of the Road. He testified that he was
born in 1940 and first rode a pony over the Road when he was five years
old. He testified using the Road during the 1940s at least six times a week.
He testified that during the 1950s he drove a Ford tractor over the road
approximately the same number of times he used the Road as in the 1940s.
He testified that after he reached age 16 he regularly drove a \ ehicle on the
Road through [Appellants' property]. He testified that during the 1960s he
and his father had a ranching partnership and [that] he and a hired hand
regularly crossed the road on [Appellants'] property in connection with the
farm and cattle ranch. He testified the frequency of his use in the 1960s
was the same as it was earlier. He testified he used the road in the same
manner during the 1970s and 1.980s. [Lowry] also testified to graduating
from the University of Utah in 1962 and to using the Road thereafter as
frequently as before. He also testified to using the Road during the 1970s
on almost a weekly basis and more often during the 1980s. He testified to
using the Road more frequently during the 1990s because h e purchased a
second home in Manti. He testified using the Road to access the Lowry
property and to monitor the Crystal Springs stream to make sure it was not
backed up. He testified that his use of the Road has been continuous since
age five and that he has never been locked out; or seen the Road blocked or
been informed that he could not use the Road.

While some evidence was initially introduced by Appellees with respect to the
Watercourse being a "natural stream", this evidence was introduced for the purposes of
establisi lit lg the backgroui id c f the pai ties' dispute, (see • < >.#., I i Ia 1 1 i J i it le 3, 21)09, at
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10:17-25; 11, 12:1-2), and possibly for the abstract proposition that a prescriptive
easement cannot apply to a natural stream because it is subject to stream alteration
permits. (See Decision, at p. 11, f 9).
However, in closing arguments counsel for Appellants acknowledged an inherent
right to convey water in a watercourse for an owner with water rights in the watercourse.
(See Trial Tr. June 3, 2009, at 236:16-22). The district court made no finding that the
watercourse at issue was a "natural stream." The district court—not the parties—first
raised Utah Code Sections 73-1-8 (duty of maintenance) and 57-13a-102 (prescriptive
easement for water conveyance) through its Decision.
Final judgment on all issues before the district court was not entered until four
months after the Decision, on January 7, 2010. In this lengthy interim, Appellants did not
object to the Decision or make any post-judgement motions.

Appellant's Notice of

Appeal was filed on February 4, 2010.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As a preliminary but dispositive matter, Appellants failed to preserve nearly all
issues they now bring on appeal. Specifically, Appellants now contend that in granting
easements in favor of Appellees: the district court improperly interpreted and/or applied
Utah Code Sections 73-1-8 and 57-13a-102; violated public policy; and failed to find
continuous use for an easement to the present. Appellants contend that they preserved all
of these issues for appeal by citing their counsel's opening statement at trial that there was
The only issue properly on appeal is Appellants' contentions regarding the sufficiency
of the evidence of the district court's findings of prescriptive easements. (See Point IV in
Appellants' Brief, at 21-22).

"no purpose" foi the easements claimed by Appellees.

Such a vague and :*..: .Iret

stateri lei it is ii isi lfficiei it to pi eserv e all of tl le specific issi les A ppellants bi ing before this
Court, particularly when Appellants had four months between the district courts Decision
and final entry of judgment during which they had ample time to bring any issues to the
'lislri'i ( c a u l ' s alkMlion
Even if appellants had properly preserved the issues on appeal—and they did
not- their arguments fail on the merits. First, Appellants contend that the district court
erred in using I Itah Code Section
IIIKIIIH' MI

i iiaii ltei lai ice to justify its

,i wills i c u n v n m u v caseirinil

\ ppellants misunderstand the Decision.

The

district court first properly founci a \<u. i onveyance easement, then properly found a
concomitant duty of maintenance under the statute associated .-. nh that easement.
Secon :1,

' > ppellai its assei t tl: lat tl i 2 distr let • ::o

•• •

conveyance easement under Utah Code Section 57 13a-102 because under that statute, a
"water conveyance" cannot be a natural watercourse such as the Watercourse at issue.
1

1 he district com I: did not fii id tl lat tl le v\ ate rcoi 11 se was "i lati iral "

"t\

had, the statute clear!) r applies to "ditches" and Appellants, their counsel, and Jieir
witnesses frequently referred to the Watercourse as a Y i k V ui tria;. While Appellants
also contend that the statute shoi lid 1: lot appl) because tl ic \\ atei coi irse 1 nay be si ibje : t to
stream,., alteratioi 1 permits, this fact is irrelevant iui . / r o s e s 01 a p : ^ v / : / :he statute.
Third, Appellants argue that the district court erred in finding prescriptive
easements because the easements violate public policy. Even if reversible error could be
based on public |»ulu y yioiniils in prescriptive easement cases, Appell tnK' 4i«?ifiiiC"h m*
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inapposite because they are founded upon the mistaken premise that the case below
constituted needless litigation.
Fourth, Appellants claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the district
court's finding of a prescriptive easement on the Road because their witnesses were more
credible than those of Appellees. However, an appellate court "may not substitute [its]
judgment for that of the trial court as trial courts are in a better position to weigh [any]
conflicting evidence and evaluate the credibility of witness testimony." hunt v. Lance,
2008 UT App 192,118, 186 P.3d 978. The district court properly made the appropriate
credibility determinations and cited specific evidence in support of its findings, which
were not clearly erroneous.
Fifth, Appellants contend that the district court erred by failing to find Appellee's
continuous use for the requisite prescriptive period to the present time.

However,

Appellants misunderstand the law of prescriptive easement as no period extending to the
present is required to find an easement. Even if it were, the district court properly found
continuous use to the present.
For all of the foregoing reasons, as set forth in more detail below, Appellees
respectfully request that this Court affirm the district court on all grounds, and in all
respects.

-9-

ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS FAILED TO PRESERVE NEARLY ALL ISSUES ON
APPEAL; THEY WERE NOT RAISED BEFORE THE DISTRICT
COURT AND NO GROUND FOR EXCEPTION IS OFFERED.
Practically none of Appellants' arguments were preserved for this appeal

Appellants raise a host of issues that w< ere nevei raised with ai ry spec ificitj • before tl le
district court. Each

» ' 'ressed below. Due \ -

K

npellants' failure to properly

preserve the relevant issues, oi pro\ ide any explanation as to w hy they should be
addressed absent preservation, this Court should not address them.
io preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue
in the trial court because a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule
on an issue. . . , I b properly preserve an issue at the district court, the
following must take place: (1) the issue must be raised in timely fashion;
(2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce
evidence or relevant legal authority.
^

'" •

h u i, 2009 I I I 14 fl8, 21 7 P 3d 704 (emphasis a< Ic lee 1; it.ii! .ernal que >tal i< MIS

ami nations omitted).
"'I he purpose of [preservation] requirements is to put the judge on notice .?; the
asserted HTOJ iiiiiiiiill ilhm lln oppmhimlv llhn i n i i n t i m i ill 111 ill iilliiiriiii ill llif "oi - •

i

proceeding." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted), An appellant's mere assertion
of facts presented at trial which may be somewhat related, but that "do not speak to the
iiKiltei" |asserted mi appeal) dlln HI ml siillianiitly prvsH'vr" ,ini .ir^nnuMil Im apf r.il

,*• \

d"

at f22. Failure to preserve or provide sufficient justification for addressing issues not
preserved is fatal to an issue on appeal. See id. at 119.

See note 2, supra.
m

A.

Appellants Failed to Preserve their Argument that the District Court
Misinterpreted Utah Code Section 73-1-8.

Appellants first argue that the district court erred by concluding that Appellees
owe a duty under Utah Code Section 73-1-8 to maintain the Watercourse.4 Appellants
contend that this issue was preserved by citing to counsel's opening statement at trial.
(Appellants' Brief, at 2; Trial Tr. June 3, 2009, at 10:12-11:12). However, the statement
only vaguely asserts that there was "no purpose" for the prescriptive easement claimed by
Appellees. Such a blanket statement cannot be considered sufficient to preserve for
appeal the district court's interpretation of section 73-1-8. See, e.g., O'Dea, 2009 UT 46,
at f22.
Significantly, the district court first raised Section 73-1-8 in its September 2, 2009
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Final judgment
was not entered until four months later, on January 7, 2010.5 In this lengthy interim,
Appellants did not bring any issue relating to Section 73-1-8 to the district court's
attention, through post-judgment motion or otherwise.
Simply put, Appellants' current contentions were never properly before the district
court; therefore they were not preserved. See State ex. rel. D.B., 2010 WL 1794700,
2010 UT App 111, 111, —P.3d— ("[Appellant's] failure to object either at trial, at the

4

Appellants specifically dispute the district court's interpretation and application of the
word "owner . . . of any watercourse" under the statute. Appellants assert that Appellees
cannot be owners under the statute based on their ownership of water rights in the
Watercourse.
5

Appellants' Notice of Appeal was filed on February 4, 2010.
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time of adjudication, or through a postjudgment motion deprived the . . . court of the
opportunity to address the claimed error . . . . [Appellant] failed to preserve his . . .
claim.").
B.

Appellants Failed to Preserve their Argument that the District Court
Misapplied Utah Code Section 57-13a-102.

Appellants also assert that the district court erred by applying Utah Code Section
57-13a-102 (which relates to prescriptive easements for water conveyances) to the
Watercourse, which they characterize as a natural stream. Appellants contend that the
issue of whether the district court properly applied the statute was preserved by citing—
for a second time—their counsel's vague opening trial statement that "no purpose" exists
for the prescriptive easement. (Appellant's Brief, at 5-6; Trial Tr. June 3, 2009, at 10:1216). As set forth above, this is insufficient to preserve the issue of whether the district
court misapplied Utah Code Section 57-13a-102. See, e.g., O'Dea, 2009 UT 46, at f22.
At the close of trial, counsel for Appellants acknowledged an inherent right for an
owner of water rights in a watercourse to convey water therein. (See Trial Tr. June 3,
2009, at 236:16-22). Moreover, under circumstances similar to those set forth in Part
1(A), supra., the district court first addressed Section 57-13a-102 in its September 2, 2009
Decision. Again, final judgment was not entered until four months later. In this lengthy
interim, Appellants did not raise any issue relating to the court's application of Section
57-13a-102, through post-judgment motion or otherwise. The issues and arguments
Appellants now raise were therefore never before the trial court and were not preserved.
See State ex. rel. D.B., 2010 WL 1794700, a t ^ l l .
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C.

Appellants Failed to Preserve their Argument that the Prescriptive
Easements Violate Public Policy.

Appellants argue that the district court erred by granting prescriptive easements
because the easements violate Utah's public policy of allowing private property owners
possession of unencumbered title. For now a third time, Appellants contend that this
issue was preserved before the district court by citing their counsel's opening trial
statement that "no purpose" exists for the prescriptive easement sought. (Appellants'
Brief, at 5-6; Trial Tr. June 3, 2009, at 10:12-16). This is insufficient to preserve the
issue of whether the easement found by the district court violates Utah's public policy of
allowing private property owners possession of unencumbered title. See, e.g., O'Dea,
2009 UT 46, at<][22.6
D.

Appellants Failed to Preserve their Contention that the Prescriptive
Period Must Extend to the Present In Order to Find an Easement.

Appellants contend that the district court committed clear error by finding a
prescriptive easement because the district court was required to find continuous use, not
just for any twenty-year period, but for a period running to the present. Appellants fail to
even cite where this issue was preserved before the district court. The issue was not
preserved.

6

Although Appellants provided the case of Alvey Dev. Corp. v. Mackelprang, 2002 UT
App 220, 51 P.3d 45, to the district court, they did not do so to bring the so-called public
policy arguments they now assert to the attention of the district court. Rather,
Mackelprang was set forth to articulate arguments relating to dominant and servient
estates. (Trial Tr. June 3, 2009, at 233:15-23). Appellants now cite the case to
improperly raise an issue for the first time on appeal.
-13-

In short, Appellants have glossed over the fact that they failed to preserve most of
the issues now on appeal. The district court was never on notice of the above purported
errors Appellants now set forth. Accordingly, this Court should not address these issues.
However, even if Appellants had preserved their contentions, they fail on the merits.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN APPLYING UTAH
CODE SECTION 73-1-8 TO FIND A DUTY OF MAINTENANCE IN
CONNECTION WITH APPELLEES' WATER CONVEYANCE
EASEMENT.
Appellants argue that the district court erred by applying Utah Code Section 73-1-

8 to "justify an easement."

Appellants' premise is not only mistaken but also

demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the district court's Decision and Utah
case law. The district court did not err in applying the duty.
Appellants mistakenly assert that the district court used Section 73-1-8 to support
its finding of a prescriptive easement in favor of Appellees. To the contrary, the district
court first found a water conveyance prescriptive easement on separate grounds, then
subsequently applied a duty to maintain the Watercourse, concomitant with the easement,
per Section 73-1-8. (Decision, at p. 8, f 2; Jan. 6, 2010 Judgment And Decree, at 2
("[A]s owner of said prescriptive easement . . . Lowry owes a duty . . . to maintain the
watercourse . . .")). The distinction is important because duties concomitant with the
ownership of easements, including those imposed by statute, are proper under Utah law,
and more particularly under Section 73-1-8.
Section 73-1-8(1) states that "[t]he owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other
watercourse shall. . . maintain it to prevent waste of water or damage to the property of
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others. . . ." See, e.g., Elder v. Nephi City ex. rel. Brough, 2007 UT 46, <|[27, 164 P.3d
1238. Utah case law expressly supports the application of these duties not just to holders
of a servient estate (e.g., Appellants), but also to holders of easements (e.g., Appellees).
See id. (fl[T]he scope of an easement holder's duty is dependent on the nature and scope
of the permitted use granted by the easement. These duties may, as in the case of
irrigation easements, be further defined by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8.").
Utah Code Section 73-1-8 does not exclude easement holders from statutory duties
as owners of a watercourse.

Therefore, Appellants miss the mark by arguing that

Appellee's ownership of water rights cannot constitute ownership under the statute, when
it is Appellees' easement that conveys ownership under the statute. The District Court
did not err in applying Utah Code Section 73-1-8.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING A PRESCRIPTIVE
EASEMENT FOR WATER CONVEYANCE UNDER UTAH CODE
SECTION 57-13A-102.
Appellants argue that the district court erred in finding a prescriptive easement

under Utah Code Section 57-13a-102 for the Watercourse, which Appellants characterize
as a "natural stream." Appellants advance three specific arguments in support of their
broader contention: (A) the statute requires maintaining a "water conveyance"—defined
as a "canal, ditch, pipeline, or other means of conveying water"—and that the doctrine of
ejusdem generis excludes so-called natural conveyances such as the Watercourse; (B) the
statute does not apply because the Watercourse cannot be "maintained" without a stream
alteration permit; and (C) the statute does not apply because no evidence was introduced
at trial that Appellees actually maintained the Watercourse.
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As a preliminary matter, it is unclear how Appellants are able to assert this
argument when, in closing arguments at trial, they acknowledged an inherent right for an
owner of water rights in a watercourse to convey water therein. (See Trial Tr. June 3,
2009, at 236:16-22). Nevertheless, Appellants' arguments, addressed in turn, are without
merit.
A.

The Watercourse is a Water Conveyance Under the Statute.

Appellants' argument that the statute does not apply to the Watercourse because it
is not a "water conveyance" is unconvincing. The district court made no specific finding
that the Watercourse is a "natural stream", as Appellants contend. Moreover, even if it
had, Appellants' interpretation of Utah Code Section 57-13a-101(1) is myopic.
Section 57-13a-101(1) refers to a water conveyance as a canal, ditch, pipeline, or
other means of conveying water. At trial, Appellants, their counsel, and their witnesses
repeatedly and alternately referred to the Watercourse as a "channel" or "ditch." (Trial Tr.
June 3, 2009, at 93:19-20; 164:14-19; 221:10-11; 233:9); see Abrogast Family Trust v.
River Crossings, LLC, 2010 UT 40, <][18, —P.3d— (applying rules of statutory
construction and stating that "words . . . should be given the meaning for which they have
for laymen in such daily usage").
Moreover, Utah statute states that a "ditch" may be either an artificial or a natural
watercourse. See Utah Code § 17B-2a-202(l); see also Abrogast, 2010 UT 40, at <][19
(applying rules of construction and examining "how the word has been historically
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defined and used in our legal system and case law.").

Therefore, the Watercourse at

properly qualifies as a "water conveyance" under the statute. A contrary interpretation
would deprive Appellees—owners of nearly all of the water rights to the Watercourse—
of the conveyance right which they have enjoyed since at least the 1940s.
B.

The Fact that a Permit May Be Necessary for Stream Alteration
Activities is Irrelevant to the Application of the Statute.

Appellants' argument that the statute does not apply because the Watercourse may
be subject to stream alteration permits is without merit on two levels. First, Appellants
assume that maintaining a water conveyance under Section 57-13a-102 necessarily and
always includes activities which "relocate [a] natural stream channel or alter [its] beds
and banks." See Utah Code § 73-3-29. It does not, and there is no authority in support of
that proposition. Second, even if maintaining a water conveyance under the statute did
include activities that would require a stream alteration permit, the statutes are not
mutually exclusive when any necessary permitting can be obtained. Indeed, the district
court properly found that the water conveyance easement was subject to any stream
alteration permitting requirements. {See Decision, at p. 9, ( | 4).

7

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has chosen to characterize a ditch by its altered
channelization attributes "designed to divert a flow of water to areas where it otherwise
would not flow." Weber, By and Through Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360,
1364 (Utah 1986).
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C.

Appellants Erroneously Assert that there Was No Evidence that
Appellees Maintained the Water Conveyance.

Without any attempt at marshalling the evidence, Appellants improperly conclude
that no evidence supported a finding that Appellees maintained a water conveyance.8
Appellants' arguments should be disregarded. See Gardiner v. York, 2006 UT App 433,
2006 WL 2979447, at *1 ("Where an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, we assume
that all findings are adequately supported by the record [and] need not consider the
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence."). Even so, ample evidence at trial and in
the district court's findings supports that Appellees did, in fact, maintain a water
conveyance.

(E.g. Trial Tr. June 3, 2009, at 30:18-24).

Therefore, Appellants'

contentions in this regard fail.
IV.

APPELLANTS' PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE INAPPOSITE AND
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR WITH RESPECT TO
PUBLIC POLICY.
Appellants mistakenly assert that the district court's grant of a prescriptive

easement violates public policy. Appellants cite Alvey Dev. Corp. v. Mackelprang, 2002
UT App 220, 51 P.3d 45, for the proposition that public policy favors certainty in title to
avoid needless litigation. The Alvey case is irrelevant for the asserted proposition as that
case addressed a prescriptive easement that had been extinguished through subsequent
division and quitclaim. See id. atfj[ 13-14.
Appellants apparently also argue the history of the parties' dispute in support of
their contention.

However, the existence of a civil property dispute between parties

8

Appellants go so far as to state that "there is simply nothing to maintain on [their]
property."
-18-

which ultimately requires adjudication is not "needless litigation", let alone the basis for
an appealable issue, as Appellants contend.

Accordingly, Appellants' public policy

arguments are without merit. Even if these arguments were somehow relevant, any error
committed by the district court in addressing or failing to address public policy was
harmless. See Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, <P2, 70 P.3d 36 ("[I]f
the error was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it
affected the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order.").
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN FINDING A
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT ON THE ROAD.
The district court did not commit clear error in holding that Appellees have a

common law prescriptive easement on the Road.
An appellate court will reverse a trial court's decision that clear and
convincing evidence was presented only if that decision is clearly
erroneous. . . . To qualify as clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings must
be either against the clear weight of the evidence or must induce a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. . . . Moreover, the
finding that an easement exists is generally so highly fact-intensive that
appellate courts accord the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when
applying the correct legal standard to the given set of facts.
hunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, <J[18, 186 P.3d 978 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Appellants essentially argue that the testimony of their witnesses refuted and
outweighed that of the witnesses of Appellees. This argument is without merit. An
appellate court "may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial court as trial courts
are in a better position to weigh conflicting evidence and evaluate the credibility of
witness testimony." See hunt, 2008 UT App 192, at <J|18. "In determining that the
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elements of a prescriptive easement had been met, the trial court made extensive findings
of fact" See id. at f 20.
For example, Mr. Lowry testified for Appellees and stated that he began using the
Road in the 1940s to obtain unimpeded daily or weekly access to Appellee's property.
(Trial Tr. June 3, 2009, at 18:15-17; 21:17-25; 34). Mr. Lowry testified that he used the
Road for various purposes, and on various occasions, through the subsequent decades of
the 1950s, 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s. (See id. at 22-23; 41:8-11). Mr. Lowry also testified
that, except for the year leading to the dispute (when he was blocked by Appellants), he
never stopped using the Road. (See id. at 30:25; 31:2-12). Mr. Lowry testified that his
use of the Road was not permissive. (See, e.g., id. at 35:19-24; 38:8-10).

In connection

with this testimony, the trial court found that Appellees used the Road on a weekly or
daily basis from the 1940fs to the present to access Appellees' adjacent property, among
other things. (See Decision, at p. 6, 115; p. 9, 16; p. 10,17). The district court properly
declared Appellees' testimony unrebutted from the 1940s to 1967. (See id., at p. 9, 1 6).
See also hunt, 2008 UT App 192, at 120 (affirming prescriptive easement under similar
circumstances). Accordingly, "there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
findings and . . . there is no clear error in the trial court's determination that there was
clear and convincing evidence of the existence of a prescriptive easement." hunt, 2008
UT App 192, at 121.
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VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR BY FAILING TO
FIND APPELLEES' CONTINUOUS USE FOR THE REQUISITE PERIOD
TO THE PRESENT.
Appellants contend that the district court committed clear error by finding a

prescriptive easement because the district court was required to find continuous use to the
present, and no evidence demonstrated the same. Appellants misunderstand the law of
prescriptive easement. Under Utah law, a prescriptive easement requires that "use of
another's land was open, continues, and adverse under a claim of right for a period of
twenty years." See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1998). It does not
require a period of twenty years to the present.
Appellants mistakenly contend that "[a]n easement cannot be said to exist where
the elements of a prescriptive easement once existed but no longer do." See, e.g.,
Kawulok v. Legerski, 165 P.3d 112, 115-16 (Wyo. 2007) (evaluating continuous use for
past periods in prescriptive easement claim); Renner v. Nemitz, 33 P.3d 255, 301-02
(Mont. 2001) (same). To the extent Appellants' argument may be construed as relating to
abandonment, abandonment of a prescriptive easement requires "a history of non-use,
coupled with an act or omission showing a clear intent to abandon." See hunt, 2008 UT
App 192, at %L5. Appellants did not show abandonment at trial, and cannot do so now.
Even if Appellees were required to show, and the district court to consider,
continuous use to the present, the district court properly found continuous use to the
present, contrary to Appellants' characterization of the record. (Decision, at p. 6, ^[15
("[Appellee] testified that his use of the Road has been continuous since age five.").
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Therefore, Appellants overreach in their contention that the district court committed clear
error with respect to evidence supporting continuous use.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Appellants failed to properly preserve the vast majority of their
contentions for appeal. While Appellants parrot their counsel's opening statement at trial
that there was "no purpose" for the prescriptive easements at issue, and references
assertions to the Watercourse as being a natural stream, this is insufficient to preserve
those specific issues of statutory interpretation, public policy, and prescriptive easement
law currently on appeal. See O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, <[22, 217 P.3d 704 (appellant's
mere assertion of facts presented at trial which may be somewhat related, but that "do not
speak to the matter [asserted on appeal] do not sufficiently preserve" an argument for
appeal). Appellants' failure to preserve is particularly evident given the length between
the Decision and final judgment before the district court, wherein Appellants could have
brought the issues on appeal before the district court. They failed to do so, and this Court
should not address their arguments.
Even so, Appellants' arguments fail on the merits. First, the district court did not
err in applying Utah Code Section 73-1-8 to find a duty of maintenance concomitant with
Appellees' water conveyance easement. As supported by Utah Case law, the duty derives
from Appellees' easement, not their water rights, as Appellee's contend. Second, the
district court did not err in finding a prescriptive easement under Utah Code Section 5713A-102. The Watercourse constitutes a water conveyance under the statute and the fact
that the Watercourse may be subject to stream alteration permits is inapposite for
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purposes of applying the statute. Third, the district court did not clearly err with respect
to public policy in finding prescriptive easements for Appellees.
Fourth, the district court did not clearly err in finding a prescriptive easement on
the Road. This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the district court and that
court properly weighed the evidence before it in making its determinations. Fifth, the
district court did not clearly err by failing to find Appellees' continuous use for the
requisite period to the present. The district court did, in fact, find continuous use to the
present, even though it was not required to do so. In short, this appeal is without merit,
and Appellee's respectfully request that this Court affirm the district court's decision on
all grounds and in all respects.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2010.

BEARNSON & PECK, L.C.

PrestOnP. Frischknecht
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees
Paul R. Frischknecht
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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G&L ENTERPRISES

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
160 North Main
Manti,UT 84642
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135
i

CAROL L LOWRY IRREVOCABLE
TRUST, FRED LOWRY, Trustee and Does
1-10,

I
1
1

Plaintiffs,

—

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 080600259

vs.

Assigned Judge: Marvin D. Bagley

G&L ENTERPRISES LLC and GUY L and
LYNDA PALMER,
Defendants.

,

Trial to the Court was held in this action on June 3, 2009. Plaintiff Carol L Lowry
Irrevocable Trust, Fred Lowry Trustee (hereafter "Lowry") appeared by and through its attorney
of record Paul R Frischknecht. Defendants G&L Enterprises LLC, Guy L Palmer and Lynda
Palmer (hereinafter collectively "Palmer") was represented by their attorney of record Douglas L
Neeley. Following the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and arguments the Court
suggested to the parties and counsel the appropriateness and desirability of a settlement and
informed the parties the Court would delay issuing its decision for a few weeks to give the parties
additional opportunity to negotiate. The parties agreed and the Court took the case under
advisement. The Court has not been informed of a resolution since that time and accordingly
now enters the following Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Lowry is the owner of approximately 186.9 acres of real property located

approximately 3/4 mile south of Manti and west of old highway 89 in Sanpete County, State of
Utah. The property will hereafter be referred to as the "Lowry property" and is more particularly
described as follows:
BEG NE COR SE 1/4 SE 1/4 SEC 14-18-2E W 23 C, S 13.50 C,
W20 C, N 13.50 C, W 2 C, N 18° E 2.50 C, E 3 C, N 49°30'E 28
C, E .75 C, N 48°E 20 C, S 4°W 656 FT M-O-L TO FENCE,
SE'LY 6 C M-O-L TO SEC LINE, S 23.25 C M-O-L TO BEG
CONT 100.46 AC
BEG 12.20 C W SE COR SEC 14-18-2E N 34015'E 21.26 C, N
2.58 C, W 23 C, S 13.50 C, W 20 C, N TO E LINE OF RGW RR,
SW ON CURVE ALONG SAID LINE RR TO SEC LINE, E TO
BEG CONT 60.50 AC
BEG 57.07 C S NW COR SEC 13-18-2E N 54 °E 9.40 C, N
47°40'W 2.18 C, N 22°50'E 3.78 C, N 47°05'E 6 C, NW'LY &
W'LY TO SEC LINE, S 18.50 C M-O-L TO BEG CONT 8.73 AC
2.

Palmer is the owner of approximately 16.37 acres of real property located

approximately 3/4 mile south of Manti in Sanpete County, State of Utah, which lies east of old
highway 89 and west of new highway 89. The property will hereafter be referred to as the
"Palmer property" and is more particularly described as follows:
BEG ON W R-O-W LINE ST HWY AT A PT N 2.40 C, W 109.34
FT SW COR SEC 13-18-2E, W 200.86 FT, N34°15E 10 RD, W
16 RDS TO E LINE OF OLD HWY R-O-W, NE'LY ALONG RO-W TO PT 1 C W, 9.43 CN, SW'LY ALONG R-O-W 2006 FT
FROM CTR SEC 13, SE'LY 361 FT M-O-L TO NW'LY R-O-W
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LINE NEW ST HWY, S 43°22'W 372.30 FT M-O-L ALONG
SAID R-0-W, S 39°33f W 300 FT ALONG R-O-W, S 43°22' W
145.20 FT ALONG SAID R-O-W TO BEG CONT 16.37 AC IN
SEC13&SEC14-18-2E
3.

The Palmer property is bordered on the west by old highway 89 and bordered on

the east by new highway 89. The Palmer property and the Lowry property are separated only by
old highway 89 which is a public road still in use.
4.

Lowry uses the Lowry property for agricultural purposes.

5.

Palmer uses the Palmer property as a primary residence as well as the location for

Palmer's farm equipment sales business and also for agricultural purposes.
6.

The Lowry property has been owned by Lowry's "family" since approximately

7.

Palmer purchased the Palmer property at the end of 1989.

8.

The State of Utah Division of Wildlife Resources owns a parcel of property on the

1852.

east side of new Highway 89. Located on the State's property is a free flowing spring known as
Crystal Springs. The water from Crystal Springs forms a stream that flows west through the
State's property, then under new highway 89, then through the Palmer property and then under
old highway 89 to the Lowry property.
9.

Lowry owns the water rights and the right to use approximately six-sevenths of

the Crystal Springs water on the Lowry property.
10.

Palmer owns the water rights and the right to use approximately one-seventh of
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the Crystal Springs water on the Palmer property.
11.

There is an unpaved road that somewhat parallels the Crystal Springs stream that

passes through the Palmer property from old highway 89 to new highway 89. The road passes by
the Palmer residence and past the Palmer's equipment business. The road is the access to both
the Palmer residence and the Palmer business. The road will hereafter be referred to as "the
Road."
12.

There currently exists bitter feelings between Fred Lowry and Guy Palmer relating

to the Crystal Springs stream and the Road. There was a conversation in which Fred Lowry
allegedly informed Guy Palmer of Fred Lowry's intention to bring a backhoe onto the Palmer
property to install a pipeline to pipe the Crystal Springs water through the Palmer property.
Palmer was allegedly offended because Mr. Lowry did not request his permission but instead
informed Mr. Palmer of his intentions. Thereafter Mr. Palmer reported Mr. Lowry's intentions to
the State of Utah Department of Natural Resources Division of Water Rights who informed Mr.
Lowry by letter dated May 1, 1998 that because the Crystal Springs stream is a natural stream
Lowry would need a stream alteration permit for such a pipeline; which permit likely would not
be issued.
Similarly Mr. Lowry reported to the State of Utah Department of Natural
Resources Division of Water Rights that Mr. Palmer had engaged in stream alteration activities
on the Crystal Springs stream by installing a diversion structure associated with installation of a
sprinkling system to irrigate the Palmer property. Allegedly prior to making that report Mr.
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Lowry came onto the Palmer property in a vehicle purporting to inspect Palmer's newly installed
diversion facility. The Palmer family was having a family function on the Palmer property at the
time and began taking pictures of Mr. Lowry. Mr. Lowry allegedly then entered his vehicle and
recklessly left the Palmer property at a high rate of speed. Mr. Lowry's alledged driving pattern
was reported to law enforcement and Mr. Lowry was charged with reckless driving to which he
entered a no contest plea in a plea in abeyance agreement. The bitter feelings that arose between
Mr. Lowry and Mr. Palmer arising out of these events is the impetus and primary motivation
between the parties for the complaint and counterclaim at issue in this case.
13.

In its complaint Lowry seeks a judicial determination declaring that it owns a

prescriptive easement in the Crystal Springs stream for the conveyance of water to the Lowry
property and that it owns a prescriptive easement on the Road for access to the Lowry property as
well as for monitoring and maintaining the Crystal Springs stream. Lowry also seeks a
declaration that the Road has been dedicated to the public as a public thoroughfare and is thus a
"public road." Lowry also seeks injunctive relief preventing Palmer from denying Lowry access
and use of the stream and the Road.
14.

Palmer's answer asserts numerous defenses to Lowry's requested relief. In

addition Palmer filed a counterclaim seeking damages for Mr. Lowry's alleged illegal entry onto
the Palmer property in October, 2007 and also seeks damages for alleged abuse of process.
Palmer alleges that Lowry filed this lawsuit for a purpose other than for which it claims; and
alleges that Lowry's actions in filing the lawsuit were done in bad faith and that the allegations in
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the complaint are not true. Palmer also seeks an injunction enjoining Mr. Lowry from
trespassing and driving recklessly on the Palmer property.
15.

Fred Lowry testified as to his use of the Road. He testified that he was born in

1940 and first rode a pony over the Road when he was five years old. He testified using the Road
during the 1940s at least six times a week. He testified that during the 1950s he drove a Ford
tractor over the road approximately the same number of times he used the Road as in the 1940s.
He testified that after he reached age 16 he regularly drove a vehicle on the Road through the
Palmer property. He testified that during the 1960s he and his father had a ranching partnership
and the he and a hired hand regularly crossed the road on the Palmer property in connection with
the farm and cattle ranch. He testified the frequency of his use in the 1960s was the same as it
was earlier. He testified he used the road in the same manner during the 1970s and 1980s.
Palmer also testified to graduating from the University of Utah in 1962 and to using the Road
thereafter as frequently as before. He also testified to using the Road during the 1970s on almost
a weekly basis and more often during the 1980s. He testified to using the Road more frequently
during the 1990s because he purchased a second home in Manti. He testified using the Road to
access the Lowry property and to monitor the Crystal Springs stream to make sure it was not
backed up. He testified that his use of the Road has been continuous since age five and that he
has never been locked out; or seen the Road blocked or been informed that he could not use the
Road.
16.

Exhibit 3 introduced into evidence is a photograph dated 1925 showing Crystal
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Springs with the Palmer Property and Lowry property in the background. The photograph shows
what appears to be an access road to Crystal Springs. All reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the photograph is that the access road depicted in the photograph passed through the Palmer
property at the approximate location of the Road at issue in this case. The logical and reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom are that Lowry's predecessors in interest used the Road to
access Crystal Springs as early as 1925.
17.

At trial Palmer introduced the testimony of Eugene Scott Williams who lived on

the Palmer property beginning in 1967 when Williams' parents purchased the Palmer property.
Williams resided on the Palmer property for approximately six years while he attended school.
He testified during that time some people did cross the Road over the Palmer property but very
seldom and not regularly. He also testified that his family placed logs to block the Road
temporarily when they were out of town; such as when they traveled to California for
Thanksgiving. He also testified his family did not want traffic on the Road because they were
raising mink; and also the dust dirtied laundry hanging on the clothesline.
18.

The testimony of Eugene Scott Williams dated back to 1967. Palmer did not

introduce evidence of use or non use of the Road prior to 1967. Lowry's testimony regarding his
use of the Road from age five in 1945 to 1967 was essentially unrebutted.
19.

Lowry also introduced the testimony of Donald D Shand, Wallace Buchanan and

William Bruce Bown to testify as to their use of the Road at various times during their lifetimes.
Their use of the Road was either as members of the public or in connection with their own farm
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and ranching operations. They did not testify as to use in connection with the Lowry property or
on behalf of Lowry or Lowry's predessors in interest.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

As owner of the Lowry property and owner of approximately six-sevenths of the

water rights of Crystal Springs Lowry owns a prescriptive easement for the conveyance of
Crystal Springs water through the Palmer property at the location of the Crystal Springs stream
pursuant to the provisions of §57-13a-102 Utah Code Ann. which states:
(1) A prescriptive easement may established if a water user has
maintained a water conveyance for a period of twenty years during
which the use has been: (a) continuous; (b) open and notorious;
and (c) adverse.
(2) If subsections (l)(a) and (b) are established, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the use has been adverse.
2.

As owner of a prescriptive easement for the conveyance of Crystal Springs water

through the Palmer property at the location of the Crystal Springs stream (watercourse) Lowry
owes a duty to Palmer and others to maintain the watercourse to prevent wasting water or
damaging the property of Palmer and others and to keep the culverts under the highways in good
repair pursuant to the provisions of §73-1-8 Utah Code Ann. which states in pertinent part:
(1) The owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other watercourse shall:
(a) maintain it to prevent waste of water or damage to the property
of others; and (b) by bridge or otherwise, keep it in good repair
where it crosses any public road or highway to prevent obstruction
to travel or damage or overflow on the public road or highway.
3.

Owners of prescriptive easements over the property of others own incidental
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rights in connection with such easements to do such acts as are reasonable and necessary to make
effective or to properly enjoy such easements. See Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 901-02
(Utah 2008).
4.

As owner of the prescriptive easement for the conveyance of Crystal Springs

water in the Crystal Springs stream through the Palmer property with the concomitant statutory
duty to maintain the watercourse Lowry necessarily and inherently has the right to go onto the
Palmer property when and where reasonably necessary to do so to monitor and maintain the
Crystal Springs stream to prevent water loss and property damage. Such a right necessarily
carries with it the right to walk along the stream and to bring onto the Palmer property such
maintenance equipment as is reasonably necessary and proper to maintain the watercourse.
Lowry's rights, however, are limited by applicable law such as stream alteration permitting
requirements.
5.

The issue of whether Lowry owns a prescriptive easement over the Road across

the Palmer property is subject to separate analysis. "An easement by prescription arises under
our common law from a use of the servient estate that is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous
for a period of 20 years." Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984) citing Jensen v.
Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981).
6.

The testimony of Fred Lowry regarding his regular use of the Road across the

Palmer property in connection with his family's ownership of the Lowry property from
approximately 1945 (which testimony of use through at least 1967 was unrebutted) established
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open, notorious, adverse and continuous use of the road for at least 20 years. The reasonable
inferences drawn from Exhibit 3 likewise establish use of the Road from prior to 1925.
7.

Based on the testimony presented at trial a prescriptive easement over the Road

was established by the use of Lowry and his predecessors in interest no later than 1965.
8.

As a defense to the establishment of a prescriptive easement over the Road on the

Palmer property Palmer asserts that prescriptive easements can only exist if the dominant and
servient properties abut. Palmer asserts the Palmer property and Lowry property are separated by
old highway 89 and thus do not abut. Palmer relies upon Alvey Development Corp. v.
Mackelprang, 51 P.3d 45 (Ut. App. 2002). Palmer's defense lacks merit. Alvey is inapplicable
to the facts in this case. Even assuming for sake of argument that properties must abut for the
creation of an appurtenant prescriptive easement, the issue in Alvey was whether such an
easement would survive the division of the dominant estate when as resulting subdivided lot did
not directly abut. Facts sufficient to establish a prescriptive easement in this case however
existed while the Palmer property and Lowry property were under separate ownership. In
addition prescriptive easements can be established in gross. In Crane v. Crane, supra, at 1064
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Plaintiffs claim an easement. Since the claimed easement is not
appurtenant to any particular dominant estate (none of the plaintiffs
own land adjoining defendant's), it is an easement in gross. Legal
requirements pertaining to the dominant and servient estates and to
easement by implication or necessity (such an unity of title
followed by severance) are therefore inapplicable. [Citations
omitted]
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9.

As a separate defense Palmer asserts that prescriptive easements cannot be

established for use of a natural stream. The Road of course if not a natural stream. Moreover,
§5 7-13 a-102 Utah Code Ann. which provides for establishment of a prescriptive easement for the
conveyance of water is not limited to artificially created waterways. Similarly §73-1-8 Utah
Code Ann. imposes maintenance duties on owners of any watercourse. The term '^watercourse"
is used numerous places in the Utah Code to define both natural and artificial waterways. The
fact Crystal Springs stream is a natural channel across the Palmer property does not prevent
Lowry from acquiring and maintaining a prescriptive easement for the conveyance of Crystal
Springs water. Palmer's defense lacks merit.
10.

Palmer also asserts that even if a prescriptive easement has been established over

the Palmer property Lowry abandoned the easement by non use; or in the alternative Palmer
extinguished the easement by prescription. Under Utah law easements may be abandoned by
establishing a history of non use coupled with clear and convincing proof of an act or omission
showing intent to abandon. The evidence presented at trial failed to establish intent on the part of
Lowry or Lowry's predecessors in interest to abandon any prescriptive rights across the Palmer
property; or the complete termination or non use of the easements. Similarly under Utah law "an
easement is extinguished by prescription where use of the property violates a servitude burdening
the property and the use is maintained adversely to a person entitled to enforce the servitude for
the prescriptive period.'1 hunt v. lance, 186 P.3d 978, 987 (Utah App.2008).
In this case Palmer has not even owned the property for the requisite 20 year
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period necessary to extinguish an easement by prescription. The testimony of prior owners of the
Palmer property do not establish facts that rise to the level of precluding use of the Road. The
testimony of Eugene Scott Williams that he and his father placed logs in front of the gates to the
Palmer property to lock off the property temporarily while they were in California for
Thanksgiving falls distantly short of the prescriptive period. Wliile such acts may be sufficient to
prevent the dedication of a road to the public under §72-5-104(1) Utah Code Ann. [see Town of
Leeds v. Prisbrey, 179 P.3d 757 (Utah 2008)] such acts are insufficient to extinguish an easement
by prescription.
11.

Palmer also defends the existence of a prescriptive easement over the Road on the

Palmer property on the grounds that Lowry has adequate access to the Lowry property over old
highway 89 and thus has no need to cross the Palmer property. While Utah law does not
preclude the creation or existence of prescriptive easements based on the fact that the dominant
estate owner may have a separate access to the dominant estate, prescriptive easements do have
limitations. First, a prescriptive easement is limited "to the nature and extent of the use by which
it was acquired.'* Crane, supra, at 1068. Second, easements are limited to uses that are reasonable
and necessary for proper enjoyment of the easement. Conatser, supra, at 901-02. Accordingly,
the frequency of Lowry's use of the Road across the Palmer property may not exceed the
frequency of use by which the easement was created. Second, Lowry may not use the Road
across the Palmer property unless it is reasonably necessary to do so. Lowry is accordingly
precluded from crossing the Road for purposes of irritating Palmer; and may only cross the Road
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when there is justification for doing so.
12.

Lowry's complaint also alleged the Road across the Palmer property had been

used by the public continuously for at least 10 years and had thus been dedicated as a public road
pursuant to the provisions of Utah's Dedication Statute §72-5-104(1) Utah Code Ann. Lowry
presented testimony from witnesses unaffiliated with the Lowry property who testified as to their
use of the Road across the Palmer property. Palmer defends the claim asserting that private
parties lack standing to establish a public easement under the Dedication Statute.
Under Utah law "certain persons are not members of the public for purposes of
the dedication statute. Individuals with a private right to use a road, such as adjoining property
owners who may have documentary or prescriptive rights to use the road are not members of the
public nor are those who have been given permission to use a road." Utah County v. Butler, 179
P.3d 775, 782 (Utah 2008). Accordingly, Lowry or anyone affiliated with the Lowry property are
not members of the public for purposes of the dedication statute. Had Lowry's non affiliated
witnesses been parties to the lawsuit they would have standing to assert the benefits of the
dedication statute in their own right. However, Utah's case law does not appear to allow a
private party to assert the public rights of another person. Palmer's affirmative defense defeats
Lowry's claim for establishment of a public road across the Palmer property.
13.

To the extent any finding of fact made herein is in substance a conclusion of law

or any conclusion of law made herein is in substance a finding of fact such findings and
conclusions are so denominated.
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14.

Each party is ordered to assume and pay its own attorneys fees and costs.

15.

Counsel for Lowry is ordered to prepare a judgment and decree reflecting the

decision made herein in accordance with Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated this / ^ o f Septeiafrg3-g2Q09.

./"'^ <*k
^\
n.

;.', A w ^ ' i: IvTarvin D. Bagley, District Court Judge
r * -\
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
CAROL L. LOWRY IRREVOCABLE
TRUST, FRED LOWRY, Trustee and
Does 1-10
Plaintiff

:
:
:

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

vs.

:
:

G & L ENTERPRISES LLC and GUY L

:

Case No. 080600259

and LYNDA PALMER

:

Judge: Marvin D. Bagley

Defendants.

:
—ooOoo—

This matter came on regularly before the Honorable Marvin D. Bagley on the 3^ day of June
2009 pursuant to Petitioner's Complaint. The Plaintiff Carol L. Lowry Irrevocable Trust, Fred
Lowry, Trustee (hereafter "Lowry") was present and was represented by it's attorney of record, Paul
R. Frischknecht.

The Defendants G&L Enterprises LLC, Guy L Palmer and Lynda Palmer

(hereinafter collectively "Palmer") was present and was represented by it's attorney of record,
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Douglas L. Neeley.
The Court having entered it's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and being thereby fully advised in the premises:

N O W THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1. That as owner of the Lowry property and owner of approximately six-sevenths of the
water rights of Crystal Springs Lowry owns a prescriptive easement for the conveyance of Crystal
Springs water through the Palmer property at the location of the Crystal Springs stream pursuant to
the provisions of §57-13a-102 Utah Code Ann. which states:
(1) A prescriptive easement may be established if a water user has
maintained a water conveyance for a period of twenty years during
which the use has been: (a) continuous; (b) open and notorious; and
(c) advcisc.
(2) If subsections (l)(a) and (b) are established, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the use has been adverse.
2. That as owner of said prescriptive easement for the conveyance of Crystal Springs water
through the Palmer property at the location of the Crystal Springs stream (watercourse) Lowry owes
a duty to Palmer and others and is therefore ordered to maintain the watercourse to prevent wasting
water or damaging the property of Palmer and others and to keep the culverts under the highways
in good repair pursuant to the provisions of §73-1-8 Utah Code Ann. which states in pertinent part:
(1) The owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other watercourse shall:
(a) maintain it to prevent waste of water or damage to the property of
others; and (b) by bridge or otherwise, keep it in good repair where it
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crosses any public road or highway to prevent obstruction to travel or
damage or overflow on the public road or highway.
3. That Lowry, as the owner of said prescriptive easement over the Palmer property owns
incidental rights in connection with such easements to do such acts as are reasonable and necessary
to make effective or to properly enjoy such easement. See Canatser V, Johnson, 194 P.3d 897,90102 (Utah 2008).
4. As owner of the prescriptive easement for the conveyance of Crystal Springs water in the
Crystal Springs stream through the Palmer property with the concomitant statutory duty to maintain
the watercourse Lowry necessarily and inherently has the right to go onto the Palmer property when
and where reasonably necessary to do so to monitor and maintain the Crystal Springs stream to
prevent water loss and property damage. Such a right necessarily carries with it the right to walk
along the stream and to bring onto the Palmer property such maintenance equipment as is reasonably
necessary and proper to maintain the watercourse. Lowry'srights,however, are limited by applicable
law such as stream alteration permitting requirements.
5. That Lowry is awarded a prescriptive easement over the Road on the Palmer property.
That the frequency of Lowry's use of the Road across the Palmer property may not exceed the
frequency of use by which the easement was created. Second, Lowry may not use the Road across
the Palmer property unless it is reasonably necessary to do so. Lowry is accordingly precluded from
crossing the Road for purposes of irritating Palmer; and may only cross the Road when there is
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justification for doing so.
6. That the Road across Palmer property is not an established public road.
7. That to the extent anyfindingof fact made andfiledin the Court's Memorandum Decision
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is in substance a conclusion of law or any conclusion
of law made and filed in the Court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law is in substance a finding of fact such findings and conclusions are so denominated.
8. That each party is ordered to assume and pay its own attorneys fees and costs.
•^1 Thatrnnrukul fin l i i w i y luai'JuriUl W|H'q^

g

made in the MemorandunvSeci^iuns and Findings of Fat t and Conclusions of Law in acoordanoe with g.
Rule- 7, Utah Rults of Civil Procedure^^,
DATED this kr

day of-Booombcr, ~"~"

MARVIN D. BAGLEY
District Court Judge

.sxss^*
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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/Q

day of December, 2009 to the following:
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Attorney at Law
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P.O. Box 7
Manti, UT 84642
Fax No. 835-5057
Secretary
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1

THE COURT:

Thank you.

2

Mr. Neeley?

3

MR. NEELEY:

4

Your Honor, first of all, our defense are — well,

Thank you, Your Honor.

5

three different phases.

First of all, Your Honor, that they

6

cannot prove — they cannot prove the elements of

7

prescriptive easement in that they don't have abutting

8

property.

9

the old State 19 - or Highway 89.

The property that the plaintiff owns is west of
And it's more than 60

10

feet wide there.

11

1900s and they have not had abutting property.

12

That's been in existence since the early

Second, the purpose for which they claim any

13

prescriptive easement doesn't exist.

14

gets on the stand, cannot tell you why he needs an easement

15

going through my client's property.

16

because there is absolutely no purpose.

17

Mr. Lowry, when he

He can't tell you

The — it is not an irrigation ditch as it referred

18

to in their pleadings, it is a natural stream.

19

designated that since the early 2000s, and — and Mr. Lowry

20

knew that.

21

lawsuit.

22

little bit before then, Mr. Lowry intended to take that and

Mr. Lowry knew that before he ever brought this
Because what he intended to do back in 1998, or a

23 I pipe that water for what purpose I don't know.
24
25 I

It has been

But he went

to the State and - and that was his intended purpose.
He came to my client sometime around then and
10

1

said, "This is what I'm going to do."

2

favor of it11 or "Do you want to do this" or - or "Do you

3

think this is a good idea," he just came to my client and

4

says, "I'm going to pipe that."

5

Not, "Are you in

And so my client went to the State and found out

6

that that in fact is a stream, it's a natural stream

7

designated by the Division of Water Rights and, when a

8

stream or a water flow like that is designated as such, no

9

one — no one can touch that stream.

Not even my client,

10

even though it runs through their property.

11

any changes to that stream or do any work o n that stream

12

without first applying for a permit from the State of Utah.

13

They can't do

We've brought — and you'll hear from Mr. Chuck

14

Williamson.

15

Division of Water Rights, and he will show you the history

16

of what's transpired here and that, in fact, Mr. Lowry has

17

had agents of his go to the State, discuss it with the

18

State.

19

from the Division of Water Resources to Mr. Lowry outlining

20

that very fact, that you don't have any right, and if you

21

want to do anything on that stream, you can't - you can't -

22

you're not permitted to go on there, you're not permitted to

There's correspondence that's come from the State

23 I do any work.
24

apply.

He's a natural stream specialist for the

And if you want to get a permit, go ahead and

But in regards to his intent to pipe it, they said,

25 I "Go ahead and make application but it won't be approved."

ii

1

And ever since that time, he's been angry with my client.

2

But that stream flows all year round.

3

Mr. Frischknecht's correct when he says that it has a lot of

4 j historical significance.

The — and it flows from my

5

client's property and it does flow across the — the old

6

highway and it does go to Mr. Lowry's property.

7

that to water his livestock that graze down there.

8
9

And he uses

The next part of our defense, Your Honor, is that,
in regards to the public, in the 1930s and

f

40s, to the east

10

of our property where Highway 89 runs, there used to be some

11

public baths.

12

baths came from the springs.

13

residents and people in the surrounding county, came down

H

the old highway, went through my client's property to the -

15

it would be to the east to visit those public baths.

And

16

because there wasn't a Highway 89 on the other side.

They

17

weren't on my client's property, they were on property to

18

the - to the east.

They were — the water used for those public
And the public, Manti

19

In 1965 - well, back up.

20

In 19 - in the last 1940s or 1950s, those baths

21

were destroyed and ceased to be used.

Public no longer used

22

them, they weren't there, they went out of existence.

23

And then around 1965 or '2, somewhere around there, the

Okay?

24 J state highway came in, further destroyed them and put
25 I through Highway 89.
12

1

My grandfather actually owns the property —

2

MR. NEELEY:

Your Honor, I'm going to object

3

here.

I don't know that - if it's not — if we're back in

4

1852, I don't know what basis — foundation they could give

5

that he would have firsthand knowledge about*

6

THE WITNESS:

7

THE COURT:

We're not talking about 1852, sir,
Lay some more foundation so we know

8

what he's — know whether he has personal knowledge or not,

9

Mr. Frischknecht.

10

Q.

(By Mr. Frischknecht)

If I may, Fred, I think the

11

issue is is what you have personal knowledge about, so let

12

me jump forward a little bit with you on that.

13

How old were you when your — when you first have

14

memories of your property out there in the Crystal Spring?

15

A.

Well, actually, since I was born.

My father

16

bought the property in 1948; I would have been eight years

17

old.

18
19
20

Q.

Let me show you what's been marked Exhibit A and

ask you if you can recognize and identify that.
A.

Well, I think this aerial photo very correctly

21

identifies the property.

22

delineation in the property lines and —

23
24

MR. NEELEY:

The new highway caused a

Your Honor, I apologize for

interrupting again, but if we're going to — are we going to

25 | have this exhibit marked?

And if we are, I want to know if

18

1

MR. NEELEY:

2

Is that Exhibit 8, the complaint?

3

MR. FRISCHKNECHT:

4

Thank you.

It is, Your Honor.

And I'll

ask that this be received based on stipulation.

5
6

Okay.

THE COURT:
Q.

Okay.

Exhibit l's received.

(By Mr. Frischknecht)

Fred, you're familiar with

7

the exhibit that's just been received into court, an aerial

8

photograph showing the general area of this claimed

9

driveway, correct?

10

A.

I am, yes.

11

Q.

You started to say a moment ago about what age you

12

were familiar with that area.

13

that — I'm going to refer to it as "the driveway," Your

14

Honor.

15

we're all on the same page, I'm going to refer to it as

16

"driveway."

17

Have you ever driven on

That's what the exhibit designates it as.

So that

Have you ever driven on that driveway, Fred?

18

A.

Numerous times.

19

Q.

And when did you first do that, as best as you can

20

recall?

2)

A.

Well, you know, I got my first pony when I was

22

five years old.

And I used to ride to the farm every day.

23

I rode through that property on my pony on a regular basis.

24

After that, it was a common occurrence to - to drive and go

25 J through the property.
21

1 I

Q.

So if I take you back to the 1950s, did you use

2 J that driveway during the 1950s?
3 !

A.

I can remember driving our tractor, our Ford

4

tractor, through it numerous times.

5

allowed to drive a vehicle until I was 16 years old.

6

that period of time, on numerous occasions — occasions drove

7

myself or with my father through that property.

8
9

Q.

I, of course, wasn't
After

Let me take you from the '50s up to the '60s.

you ever either drive through it during the '60s, walk

10

through it or go through it by any other means, bicycle,

11

otherwise?

12

Did

A.

My father and I had a - a partnership, Crystal

13

Spring Ranches, and we partnered together.

14

Salt Lake City but came to Manti on a regular basis.

15

the one that worked the cattle, basically worked the farm.

16

My father fell ill and the basic responsibility — we had a

17

hired hand, but the basic responsibility fell on my

18

shoulders, and we did drive through there on a regular

19

basis, as did our hired hand.

20

Q.

I was living in

Go up the next decade, in the — well, let me go

21

clear forward, '70s and '80s, did you ever use that

22

driveway?

23
24
25 J

I was

A.

Absolutely.

In the same way that I just

described.
Q.

Did anyone during that period of time ever try to
22

1

stop you from using that driveway?

2

A,

Never.

3

Q.

On the — on the west side of the driveway where it

4

But never was it barricaded or locked.

connects, looking at the exhibit, to what's been referred to

5 I as the old state highway, is there a gate?
A.

No.

There's never been a gate there. Maybe

umpteen years ago there was a partial fence, but there — but
it was never - let me explain the geography of that.
As is indicated in the deeds, our water right
includes the right to generate electrical power from that
stream.

And there was a building off to the southwest of

where Mr. Palmer lives right now.
MR. NEELEY:

I'm going to object, Your Honor.

Again, this is narrative —
THE WITNESS:
MR. NEELEY:

But — and it's based on facts that are

not in evidence, and ask that it be stricken, actually.
THE COURT: Mr. Lowry, I'm going to have you
respond to questions that — we can't: have a narrative.

We

just can't have you get up and tell your story, you have
to — it has to be in response to questions.
MR. NEELEY:

Your Honor, he also referred to

deeds, though, that haven't been offered into evidence, and
ask that that portion be stricken.
THE WITNESS:

Excuse me?

What was that comment?
23

1

Q.

Backing up to the prior owner, Gene and Beverly

2

Williams - and their son Scott's here to testify today - did

3

anyone in the Williams family, or any of their agents, ever

4

tell you that you were not to use that driveway?

5 I

A.

No.

8

Q.

If you go back to the prior owners, the Giles, the

7

Bartons, the Bonds, the Gillespies, did any one of them ever

8

tell you that you were not to use that driveway?

9

A,

Absolutely not.

10

Q.

Did anyone ever attempt to stop you from using

11

In fact, we were welcomed.

that driveway?

12

A-

No.

13

Q.

This might be a hard question, Fred, but going

14

back through the years, 40 or 50 years, how often would you

15

say, on a yearly basis, that you've either walked through or

16

driven through that driveway between old highway and new

17

highway?

18

A.

Well, that's a difficult question to answer.

I

19

didn't keep a — a notebook.

That spring is the lifeline to

20

our property.

21

it was a ditch that ran through our property.

22

necessary for us to monitor that on a regular basis to see

23

that it wasn't being backed up and spread out, whereby we'd

24

lose water.

25

Q.

And the fact that the — the stream or the —
It was

So is it fair to say there's never been a time

30

1
2

when you have ceased or stopped using that driveway?
A.

3
4

There never has.
MR. FRISCHKNECHT:

I think that's all the

questions I have at this time.

5

THE WITNESS:

May - can I qualify that?

6

MR. FRISCHKNECHT:

7

THE WITNESS:

Sure.

I have not used it since Mr. Palmer

8

put no trespassing signs up a year - a year ago.

9

year ago.

10

MR. FRISCHKNECHT:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. NEELEY:

13

About a

That's all.

Cross-examine?
Thank you, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

14 I BY MR. NEELEY:
15

Q.

You were born in 1940, right?

16

A.

That's correct.

17

Q.

And — and you got the property in 1948, right?

18

Your family.

19

A.

That f s correct.

20

Q.

And your family owned that property for a total of

21

80 days, right?

22

A.

Excuse me?

23

Q.

Total of 80 days.

You owned Mr. Palmer's

24 I property, your parents received it on May 12th, 1948 and
25 J deeded it away July 31st, 1948.

That's 80 days.

Isn't that
31

1
2

Q.

Eight years old.

Okay.

So 1948, right?

What was

your purpose in going into the Palmer property?

3

A.

To get to our property.

4

Q.

You didn't own property to the east.

5 I

A.

Excuse me?

6 I

Q.

What direction did you travel?

7

A.

I traveled the — the highway, went through the

8

sagebrush where the new county jail is, followed down

9

directly through the old swimming pool, through the property

10

where Mr. Palmer's home is, had dear friends that lived

11

there.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Stopped often — dated one of the girls that lived

14
15

there — and then continued on to our property.
Q.

Okay.

So there wasn't any road or trail, you just

16

got on your horse, went through the sagebrush and went down

17

through, I guess, in the same direction that the new Highway

18

89 is; is that right?

19

A.

Well, in the same direction.

20

Q.

You went south.

21

A.

But for your statement to say there was no road,

22
23
24
25

that's not true.
Q.

Okay.

I went south, yes.

And then you went through —

There was a road.
And then you went down from east to west

after Mr. Palmer's property.
A.

That's correct.

34

1

Q.

That's in the 1940s, okay?

2

A.

That's correct.

3

Q.

And what was your reason for doing that?

4

A.

To go to work.

5

Q.

To your farm.

6

A.

That's exactly right.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

Right?

You had no purpose in going on Mr. Palmer's

property other than just to go through it, right?

9

A.

Me personally?

10

Q.

Yes.

11

A.

Well, yeah.

12

Q.

Okay.

I was a child.

All right.

So then we come — and so that

13

was your only reason.

So in the 1940s, is it fair to say -

14

well, how many times do you think you did that in the 1940s?

15

Took that route.

16

A.

How many — how many times a week?

17

Q.

How many times?

18

A.

At least six times a week.

19

Q.

Six times a week.

Okay.

And did those — did you

20

ask the people that owned the property at that time if you

21

could go through there?

22

A.

NO.

23

Q.

You didn't ask.

24 J

A.

25

Q.

No.
Okay.

Then, in the 1950s, how often did you do
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1 I graduated from the University of Utah in 1962.
2 I
3

Q.

Okay.

So you have a recollection of when the

State put in new Highway 89.

4

A.

Yes, I do.

5

Q.

All right.

6

And so, from the 1960s, how often did

you go from the west to the east to go to the spring?

7

A.

Just as often as we did before.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

And did you ever ask the Williams'

permission to do that?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

The same as we did prior to that.

14

Q.

Well, before it was weekly.

15

A.

Pretty close, yes.

16

Q.

When did your father die?

17

A.

My father died in 1976.

18

Q.

Okay.

12

19

In the 1970s, then, how often did you do

that?

Is it weekly now?

So you were still coming from Salt Lake and

going through that on a weekly basis.

20

A.

That's right.

Did you hear me say that we had a

21

partnership?

22

Q.

Yes, I did.

23

A.

Do you understand that?

24

Q.

A partnership?

25 )

A.

Uh-huh.

Uh-huh.
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1 I

Q.

I sure do.

2

A.

Okay.

We were in the cattle business together.

3

Q.

Okay.

And then in the 1980s, how often did you go

4
5
6
7

through there?
A.

Probably more often, because I was spending more

time down here.
Q.

Okay.

The reality is, from the 1960s, there was

8

no need for you to go through that property to go to your

9

spring, correct?

Because you can —

10

A.

No, I wouldn't say that's right.

11

Q.

Well, tell me why you didn't have to go there to

12

go to the spring.

13

property.

14
15
16
17

A.

The spring's not on Mr. Palmer's

That's right.

But that was the natural pathway

that we always took for years and years.
Q.

There's no need to go through Mr. Palmer's

property to visit the spring, is thesre?

18

A.

We always used that route.

19

Q.

Is there any reason now to go through the Palmer

20

property to go to the spring?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

What's that?

23 I

A.

To go to the spring and to monitor the stream.

24

Q.

Okay.

25 J

A.

And to monitor what Mr. Palmer's doing with his
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1

water.

2

Q.

You monitor that?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

How often do you do that now, living in Salt Lake?

5

A.

And have the right to put a — a meter on it.

6

Q.

You've never done that.

7

Q.

We haven't put a meter on it, n o .

8 I

Q.

You've done no work on that stream for many, many

9

years.

10

A.

That is not true.

11

Q.

When was the last time you did work on that?

12

A.

The person that we leased the property to -

13

Q.

Uh-huh.

14

A.

— goes through there regularly to remove debris.

15 I

Q.

He never drives a vehicle through there.

16

A.

I - I can't tell you that.

17

Q.

And that's the only reason he goes through there

18

is just to remove debris, right?

19

A.

Yeah.

20

Q.

And you've actually leased that property out for

21

To check our water, our interests, right.

many years.

22 I

A.

Several years.

Several years.

23

Q.

And that's Mr. Fotts, right?

24

A.

He's been one of the lessees.

25 J

Q.

Well, he's had it for, what, 13 or 14 years?
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1

A.

I don't know.

I can't tell you exactly,

2

MR. NEELEY:

3

(Pause in proceedings.)

4

MR. NEELEY:

5

THE COURT:

6 I
7
8
9
10

May I have just a moment, Your Honor?

That's all I have, Your Honor.
Any redirect?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FRISCHKNECHT:
Q.

Fred, Mr. Neeley took you through several decades

there but didn't get to the '90s.

Did you use that driveway

in the 1990s?

11

A.

Absolutely.

12

Q.

And approximately how often did you do that?

13

A.

Well, I purchased a home here for the purpose of

u

being closer.

As I indicated in my opening statement, I

15

have two residences, and the purpose of that was to provide

16

me more opportunity to go there.

17

Q.

You testified that you didn't keep a log.

18

A.

That's correct.

19

Q.

But as best you can recall, through all of these

I had no reason to keep a log.

20

years, including the 1990s, would you estimate that use of

21

that driveway to be once a week, once a month, once a

22

quarter?

23

A,

It would probably —

24

Q.

The best you can recall, what would be your

25 J response?
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1 I essentially, any watercourse that receives sufficient
2 I quantities of water on an annual basis to develop an
3
4
5

ecosystem that differs from the surrounding environment.
Q.

8
9

I'm going to hand you what's been marked

Exhibit — well, first I'm going to start with this.

6
7

Okay.

I assume that someone, either you or someone from
your office, goes out and - and looks at the water source.
A.

In most cases, if we're unfamiliar with the

watercourse in question, we would take a site visit to look

10

at permanent applicability, the resource value of that

11

particular watercourse.

12

Q.

Okay.

And at some point, you determine whether or

13

not there is an ecosystem there and whether or not it

14

would — it should be classified as a natural stream.

15

A.

Correct.

16

Q.

If you look at — I'm going to hand you Defendant's

17

Exhibit No. 4.

Are you familiar with the water stream that

18

is part of the issue here at trial?

19

A.

Yes, I am.

20

Q.

Crystal Springs Channel.

21
22 [
I
23

It's the Crystal Springs Channel.
And has that been

designated as a natural spring?
A.

Upon our site visit, yes, we determined that there

is sufficient riparian and wetland vegetation adjacent to

24 I the channel to designate it as a natural stream, as
25 J regulated by our program.
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1

pump.

2

pump system.

3 I
4
6

What this Chuck Williamson testified of is our new

Q.

Is that the digging that you were referring to as

the A.

No.

Underground waterlines to — to feed — feed

6

the sprinklers, bring us our water off of Palisades and so

7

on and so forth.

8
9

Q.

Out of that Crystal Spring water, you own how much

of that?

10

A.

One-seventh.

11

Q.

And that's made in decree by the Cox decree,

12

correct?

13

A.

That is.

14

Q.

Okay.

15
16

So how do you utilize your one-seventh of

that Crystal Spring water?
A.

We use that water starting Monday morning of each

17

week for a 24-hour period, dam up the - the Crystal Spring

18

ditch or stream and send it into this diversion box and pump

19

out of that diversion box into our sprinkler lines.

20
21

Q.

And you have some other water rights as well,

correct?

22

A.

We do.

23

Q.

And what is that?

24

A.

We have some Palisade water and some Manti water

25 J in addition to our — our spring — stream.
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1

THE COURT:

Thank you.

2

Mr. Neeley?

3

MR. NEELEY:

4

he was drug here by Mr. Lowry.

5

the Court, before it makes a decision, to look at the

6

complaint, the complaint that was drafted by Mr. Lowry and

Your Honor, Mr. Palmer's here because
We were sued.

And I'd ask

7 I the claims that he made.
8
9

He claimed that he took heavy equipment, he
claimed the public has used that very regularly and

10

consistently for over a hundred years.

11

taken heavy equipment in and done work on the ditch.

12

that's why he came in here, to preserve the public's right

13

to go through there, through that road, and for him to do

14

work on the ditch.

15

He claimed that he'd
And

There has been no evidence, absolutely no

16

evidence, to support half — half of the allegations in his

17

complaint.

None.

18

That's why we're here.

19

Then we — and we think we're here because he's

20

upset with Mr. Palmer, first in 1998, because he couldn't

21

pipe the stream.

22

Mr. Palmer because he came up on the property, Mr. Palmer

Second, in 2007, he's upset with

23 I considered that trespass, he called law enforcement 24

THE COURT:

25 I

MR. NEELEY:

I can tell you why we're here.
- and he was prosecuted.
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1 j the old highway.

But other than that, he just came to talk

2 I to them, make some comment.
3

M r , Williams, who was there from 1967 to 1984,

4

says he never saw Fred Lowry go on the property, never ever.

5

He said he saw his father — or Mr. Lowry's father go there

6

to visit his father.

7

years.

8

him to go up on that property, never instructed him to go

9

along the ditch, he never instructed him to do anything in

10

He worked for the man for several

And during that period of time, he never instructed

regards to Mr. Palmer's property.

11

And so you're going to have to judge the

12

credibility of — of those witnesses in regards to that. But

13

just like the public use, it can't be sporadic.

14

b e regular and consistent for some reason and purpose.

15

It has to

I think - if — if you don't have a prescriptive

16

easement, then you have a...

17

appurtenance.

18

case that was — Kanab case that's in the Sixth District

19

Court, Judge Mclff was the judge that got overturned on

20

that, he says there's four — the court found there's four

21

basic elements that must be met for a prescriptive —

22

appurtenant prescriptive easement to survive a division of

23

the dominant estate.

24 I
25

you can have an easement by

And in the Alvey

case, 2002, the

Mackleprang

When they pled this, they said there - they were
the dominant state; we're the servient state.
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1

bring any equipment on it.

2

and — and check for debris?

3

Mr. Williamson suggested that that's what somebody could do.

4

But if they're going to do anything more than that —

5
6

THE COURT:

Can he walk down the stream
Yeah.

I think even

So you don't have a problem with

Mr. Lowry walking up and down the stream?

7

MR. NEELEY:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. NEELEY:

To check for debris.
Uh~huh.
Right.

But that would be the limit

10

of his — what he could do on the property.

11

find that he had a prescriptive easement, that would be the

12

limit of it.

13
u

Right.

If you

That would be the limit of it.

THE COURT:

But that issue's not before me,

whether he has a prescription up and down the -

15

MR. NEELEY:

16

THE COURT:

No.

No.

It's not.

What about just an inherent right?

If

17

you have water, don't you have a right to make sure that the

18

water gets downstream?

19

MR. NEELEY:

You do.

Based on what Mr. Williamson

20

said, though, your right is limited to that activity, to

21

only going down to check for debris to see if, in fact, your

22 J water's being inhibited in some way, your —
23
24
25

THE COURT:

Let me ask you this.

Your client is

open — runs a business there.
MR. NEELEY:

Uh-huh.

236

